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1 Although a video recording of a transaction does
not prove anything if the ATM clock and video
clock are not synchronized, for which see a murder
case where the wrong people were arrested in the
USA in Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 3.20-3.22.
2 Prima facie evidence in Germany is similar to a
presumption in English jurisprudence.
3 See in detail Gerwin Haybäck, Risikohaftung bei
missbräuchlichen Bankomatbehebungen: Ein
österreichisch-deutscher Rechtsvergleich (Neuer
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag GmbH Nfg KG, 2008), 45
and following.
4 See the report: ‘Bankomat: Kartensperre schützt
nicht’ (‘ATM: Card blocking does not protect’),
available at: http://www.klartext.at/downloads/
presse/bankomat kartensperre nuetzt nicht.PDF.
5 Note by editor: card issuers purport to have
mechanisms in place to detect fraud of this nature,
so if a card issuer fails to implement the mechanism
where large amounts are removed from an account
that is not within the normal spending patter of the
card holder, the fault may be with the card issuer,
not the card holder. Fraud detection is a pattern
recognition problem and it can be carried out either
using expert systems where people write the rules,
or training a system by providing data, and for it to
establish the rules. However, detecting fraud is far
more complex. It is necessary to consider what
types of fraud are known, then to be alert to a
change in fraud patterns that avoid the previous
patterns, then when new patterns are detected, the
new patterns must be countered. It is necessary to
understand that in attempting to detect fraud, the
early cases of a new type of fraud may not be
detected for some time. A significant problem when
dealing with allegations that a customer is
responsible for a withdrawal from an ATM, is that
nobody in this field will explain what they are
looking for, or publishes any analysis on how good
they might be at identifying patterns of fraud.
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ARTICLE:
The liability for unauthorized withdrawals at
automatic teller machines (German: Geldautomat;
Austria: Bankomat) (ATMs) and point of sale
terminals (POS) is caused by the manipulations of
unauthorized third parties, sometimes because of
the incautious behaviour of the cardholder, where
the loss of a card is exacerbated as a result of the
PIN being recorded with the card in some way. The
bank may also refrain from taking precautions,
such as providing an effective shield to terminals,
refusing to record a transaction with the use of
video or CCTV,1 and failing to provide for increased
program code and internet safety. The aim of this
article is to discuss what can be considered a fair
allocation of risks. It deals with system security
and different methods exercised by criminals in
order to detect the personal identification number
(PIN). The prima facie evidence granted in favour
of the bank is a controversial issue discussed in
relation to substantive law and case law.2
Introduction
The first time a card holder may become aware that an
unauthorized transaction might have occurred at an ATM
or POS, is when they notice an unknown debit posting on
their current account.3 Accordingly, the card holder will
probably inform the card issuer that the posting is an
unknown withdrawal against their account, and the debit
should be refunded.
The card issuing bank, on the other hand, will probably
respond by pointing out that only the card holder knew
the PIN, which can be four numbers (as in the UK for
instance) or four or five numbers (as in Germany for
instance). This means it is assumed that the card holder
has complete control over the card (also known as bank
card, payment card, bank customer card, debit card). The
card issuer may well reach the conclusion that either the
card holder must have withdrawn the respective amount
at the ATM, or they authorized a third person so to do, or
they were so negligent as to permit an unauthorized third
person to obtain possession of the card and PIN. Where
the card holder loses control over their PIN or card, or
both PIN and card, it may be that third persons have
obtained the card and discovered the PIN, then they
attempt to remove as much cash as possible before the
card is retained. Whatever happens, the law of evidence
and how the pleading are drawn up will be of great
importance in establishing which party is put to proof to
prove their case.
Occasionally, a criminal will obtain possession of
several charge or credit cards, and within a short period
of time, the maximum amount is removed because the
criminals know that the card is blocked only after two (or
more) hours.4 The card issuer notices the theft only after
some time.5 Consequently, the ATM card is frequently
blocked too late. Therefore, it is important to establish
58 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
criteria for the distribution of risks and charges between
the contracting parties. The allocation of risks
concerning the damages caused by third parties is of
importance, especially if the offender is unknown or has
no assets when caught and successfully prosecuted. On
the one hand the card holder is obliged to use the two
components (card and PIN) together. On the other hand,
the card holder always has to keep the two components
strictly separated for security reasons. The most
frequent attacks are to manipulate an ATM, or to create
a cloned card. Occasionally, criminal energy focuses
upon discovering secret numbers.
Concerning the substantive law of contract, it is
necessary to determine the duties of care the card
holder is required to comply with. Second,
consideration must be given to the standard of care and
security that should be the responsibility of the credit
services sector. This article primarily deals with the
security of the PIN system. In addition, the question of
liability concerning the PIN (as the present electronic
instrument of identification) is discussed. The analysis
deals with the liability for damages in civil law, not
criminal law.
Liability and the German EC system
The German EC ATM system is a participant of the
European Europay ATM system and the Global Maestro
system.6 There arrangements permit transnational
withdrawals at ATMs and POS payments for goods and
services. When the EC card (including the Maestro logo
as well as the electronic cash logo) is used at an ATM, a
legal transaction takes place within the single mandate
between the card holder and the card issuer. In
accordance with section 665 of the German Civil Code
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), these mandates comply with
the authority to make a payment from the account of
the card holder:
§ 665 Abweichung von Weisungen
Der Beauftragte ist berechtigt, von den Weisungen
des Auftraggebers abzuweichen, wenn er den
Umständen nach annehmen darf, dass der
Auftraggeber bei Kenntnis der Sachlage die
Abweichung billigen würde. Der Beauftragte hat vor
der Abweichung dem Auftraggeber Anzeige zu
machen und dessen Entschließung abzuwarten, wenn
nicht mit dem Aufschub Gefahr verbunden ist.
Section 66547
Deviation from instructions
The mandatary is entitled to deviate from the
instructions of the mandator if he may assume in the
circumstances that the mandator would approve of
such deviation if he were aware of the factual
situation. The mandatary must make notification to
the mandator prior to such deviation and must wait
for the decision of the latter unless postponement
entails danger.
The EC card is a payment (debit) card, in accordance
with the provisions of section 676h of the German Civil
Code. Subsequently, the card issuing bank is entitled to
demand reimbursement of expenses for use of a
payment card only where it was not abused by a third
party. Apart from the possibility of excluding claims for
expenses, there still remain the card issuer’s claims for
damages against the card holder, in accordance with the
general regulations (sections 280 and 281 of the
German Civil Code).
Risks associated with the PIN 
Methods to detect the PIN
As the result of the experience with ATM systems at the
time of writing,8 it is known that taking cash out of a
bank account at ATMs is much safer than relying on the
cheque guarantee card system.9 Experienced criminals
can forge a signature in such a way that the average
recipient of a cheque cannot discover the deception.10
An unauthorized withdrawal using the correct PIN is a
forgery, although it follows that the PIN itself can be
only correct or incorrect. Card issuers fail to understand
this logic, and therefore it is incorrectly assumed that
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6 The agreement was concluded between the
Federal Association of the German Volksbanken
and Raiffeisenbanken, the Federal Association of
the German Banks, the German Sparkassen- and
Giroverband as well as the Federal Association of
Public Banks of Germany (all of them incorporated
societies), in force from 1 December 2003; see
Karsten Schmidt, Zu E. Bankkartenverfahren; 1.
Vereinbarung über das deutsche ec-
Geldautomatensystem, in: Münchener Kommentar
zum HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch is the Commercial
Code), 2nd edition, (beck on-line, 2009).
7 Translation taken from http://bundesrecht.juris.de/
englisch_bgb/index.html.
8 The history of the eurocheque system is covered in
Ewald Judt and Alfred Scholz, 35 Jahre
Geldausgabeautomat – 20 Jahre Bankomat in
Österreich, ÖBA (2000) 839.
9 For contributions that deal with the advantages
and disadvantages of the eurocheque system, see
Ewald Judt, Der eurocheque: 1968 – 2001 – ein
Nachtrag, ÖBA (2003) 136; fundamentally Gerwin
Haybäck, Zur Risikoverteilung bei
Euroscheckfälschung, ÖBA (1997) 251.
10 Michael Bucher, Die Risikoverteilung bei der
Benutzung elektronischer kartengesteuerter
Zahlungssysteme, (P. Lang, 1992), 180; Günter H.
Roth, Grundriß des österreichischen
Wertpapierrechts, Wien: Manz, 2nd edition (1999)
85 and following: checking the signature on forged
EC cheques.
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the card holder has a duty of care to prevent the passing
of the PIN to third persons. Where a third person
obtains the PIN, it is assumed that the card holder has
been engaged in careless behaviour, despite the ease
by which a PIN can be obtained by a third person. The
PIN is the most important identifier of the (authorized)
card holder at ATMs and POS terminals. Card holders
are contractually bound to keep the PIN safe, and are
not entitled to inform anybody voluntarily of the PIN.11
This requires a discussion as to how a third person is
able to detect the correct PIN. The three most frequent
causes are breach of secrecy, spying to obtain the PIN,
and guessing the PIN.
Breach of secrecy
The card holder has a contractual duty to take care of
their card and PIN. The issue is to establish what those
duties might be. Both the prevailing opinion as well as
the conditions for the use of the Maestro Card oblige
the card holder to keep his PIN confidential and never
pass the PIN to others.12 In particular, the PIN must not
be noted on the card or otherwise stored together with
it, even in an altered form.13 Should the card holder keep
the Maestro card and code close together, they
undermine an important component of the Maestro
safety system.14
In 1999, it was held by the Local Court in Hamburg
that keeping the EC card in the hip pocket of a pair of
trousers (without carrying the secret number) was not
regarded a grossly negligent violation of the duty to
care.15 ‘Saving the EC components separately’16 means
keeping them in different boxes, pieces of furniture and
locked drawers,17 or in different pockets of items of
clothing.18
The Local Court in Kassel has determined that it is
extremely careless behaviour to keep a note of the PIN
in an address book together with the ATM card.19 Such
behaviour is in conflict with the strict duty of secrecy
stipulated in the conditions for the use of the Maestro
Card, in accordance with the prevailing case law. This
method of concealing the PIN is well-known by
criminals.20 However, in the opinion of Professor Udo
Reifner, such behaviour cannot be considered
unreasonable. It is usual for a person to make a
permanent record of the PIN for the purposes of an aid
to memory. Further, he also approves the transmission
of the PIN to persons of trust.21
Nevertheless, if the card holder fails to notice the loss
of an ATM card by taking money out or placing money,
account statements, and the ATM card carelessly into
the pocket of a coat or jacket, such behaviour is
considered as grossly negligent, in accordance with a
decision by the District Court at Halle.22
The requirement of isolating the card in a safe is out
of touch with everyday life. On the one hand, the card
holder acts grossly negligently if he is absent for three
or four hours while leaving the card and the PIN on the
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11 In contrast, concerning to the duty of secrecy, the
card holder only has to afford a reasonable, i.e.
conventional duty of care (in German: ‘zumutbar’,
what can be expected of an average card holder).
Full particulars are discussed by Stefan Werner in
Thorwald Hellner and Stephan Steuer (editors),
Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz 6/1463.
12 Although informing others of the PIN seems to be
practiced in particular between family members,
nevertheless the prevailing opinion is strictly
against any transfer of the PIN, for which see Franz
Häuser and Lutz Haertlein, E.
Bankkartenverfahren, in Münchener Kommentar
zum HGB, 2nd edition, (beck on-line 2009) Rn E 33
and following; likewise Ernst Heymann, Norbert
Horn, and Peter Balzer, Handelsgesetzbuch
(Commercial Code), 2nd edition, (2005) section
372 annex; Adolf Baumbach, Wolfgang Hefermehl,
and Matthias Casper, Wechselgesetz,
Scheckgesetz, Recht der kartengestützten
Zahlungen, 23rd edition (2008) Rn 36; Wolfgang
Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-Nutzung, WM
(1998) 1264, 1269; Viola Russenschuck, Die
Auszahlung von Bargeld an Automaten nach
deutschem Zivilrecht (2002) 75 and following; for
dissenting views, see Christian Hofmann,
Schadensverteilung bei Missbrauch der ec-Karte,
WM (2005) 441, 444 and Professor Dr. Udo Reifner,
Die Haftung des Kontoinhabers bei Missbrauch
seiner Bankomatkarte durch Dritte, BB 1912, 1918.
13 Stefan Werner, Verantwortlichkeit bei
missbräuchlicher Verwendung der ec-Karte unter
Eingabe der richtigen PIN, BKR (2004) 50.
14 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1264, 1269.
15 Local Court Hamburg, VuR (1999) 88.
16 BGH WM (2000) 2421, 2422.
17 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269, referring to District
Court Essen, WM (1988) 493 and District Court
Hanau, ZIP (1995) 559.
18 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269, referring to Local Court
Hannover WM (1996) 2013.
19 Local Court Kassel, I D 5. b – 1. 95 WuB, Pfeiffer.
20 Local Court Kassel, WM (1994) 2110; see Stefan
Werner in: Thorwald Hellner and Stephan Steuer
(editors), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1470; Horst Ahlers, Die neuen Bedingungen für
ec-Karten, WM (1995) 601, 607; dissenting
Hartmut Strube, Haftungsrisiken der ec-Karte, WM
(1998) 1210 and following.
21 Professor Dr. Udo Reifner, Die Haftung des
Kontoinhabers bei Missbrauch seiner
Bankomatkarte durch Dritte, BB (1989) 1912 and
following.
22 District Court Halle, WM (2001) 1298.
Where a third person obtains the PIN, it is assumed
that the card holder has been engaged in careless
behaviour, despite the ease by which a PIN can be
obtained by a third person.
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In order to provide for the safety of the maestro system,
the credit services sector promotes the physical shielding
of the front of ATMs, as well as a nationwide development
of video control at each ATM.
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desk in his flat,23 or if he keeps both components in a
folder.24 However, the card holder is entitled to
physically carry the card as well as the PIN. On the other
hand, the PIN must not be written down on the card or
otherwise stored together, to avoid a thief obtaining the
PIN if the card is stolen.
In what is known at the ‘Hospital case’, the court
made high demands on the safe keeping of the card and
PIN. It was determined that keeping the card with the
PIN (camouflaged as a four-digit telephone number)
was a grossly negligent contributory cause that allowed
a third party to obtain unauthorized access to the
account. The card holder was not exculpated by putting
both components (card and code) into a solid strong
box in a locked sick room. It is a matter of fact that a
hospital is considered an unsafe location where the
theft of such items cannot be excluded.25
The cumulative effect of judicial pronouncements
indicates that it is necessary to keep the components
(card and PIN) strictly separated, even in private rooms.
According to a recent judgement of the Federal Court of
Justice of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), the
customer does not act grossly negligent if they keep the
card and PIN in different rooms of a flat, and, as a result,
unauthorized, abusive withdrawals follow.26 Within the
domestic arrangements of a family home, it is not
necessary to take measures against theft between
family members where the relationships between family
members are in good order, and if the card issuer does
not request special protective measures to be put in
place caused by any specific circumstances the family
might find themselves in. Examples where the card
issuer might consider that there are special
circumstances that require additional consideration for
security are flat-sharing communities or residential
homes where family members are not present.
In a recent judgment of the Higher Regional Court of
Düsseldorf, it is considered to be grossly negligent if a
purse containing the card is placed in a shopping trolley
in a department store.27
Observing the PIN by third parties
It is possible to differentiate between active and passive
observation of the PIN.28 The most common method is
passive observation, such as looking over someone’s
shoulder, especially at ATMs in busy places or at POS
terminals in supermarkets. Criminals will go to the
length of renting flats across from ATMs for this
purpose. Thus, they take possession of different PINs by
using binoculars, telephoto lens, mini-spy-cameras, or
by transmitting the PIN to an external personal
computer where the ATM has been manipulated by the
criminal to obtain the PIN when the PIN is entered into
the ATM.
In order to provide for the safety of the maestro
system, the credit services sector promotes the physical
shielding of the front of ATMs, as well as a nationwide
development of video control at each ATM.29 On the
other hand, the card holder is obliged to take
reasonable precautions. If the card holder takes cash
out of the bank account at ATMs, or makes payments at
POS terminals, they have to stay away from the next
customer, protect the number pad, and such like.30
It is possible to fabricate a clone of the card and take
cash out of the victim’s bank account at an ATM in a
foreign country if a criminal obtains sufficient
information from the card and knows the correct PIN.
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23 District Court Frankfurt 1. December 1992, 2/13 0I
98/92.
24 Higher Regional Court of Nürnberg WM (1989) 405;
Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner and Stephan
Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1470.
25 District Court Bonn, NJW-RR (2000) 1415.
26 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2001)
286.
27 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, BKR (2008)
41.
28 Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
(1997) 121, 124; Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Die
Sicherheit von Magnetstreifenkarten im
automatisierten Zahlungsverkehr, CR (1997) 174.
29 Various authors demand an obligation of the
banks to provide an area-wide video control of
ATMs, see Professor Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
1997, 121 (123); Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner
and Stephan Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und
Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz &/1481.
30 Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
(1997) 124; Werner Schindler, Die neuen PIN-
Nummern der ec-Karten, NJW-CoR (1998) 223, 226;
Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner and Stephan
Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1469.
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31 Manfred Lochter and Werner Schindler, Missbrauch
von PIN-gestützten Transaktionen mit ec- und
Kreditkarten aus Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 292,
294. Concerning the risk of forging bank cards in
Austria, see Gerwin Haybäck, Haftungsfragen bei
Totalfälschung der ec-Karte, wbl (1999) 56.
32 District Court Halle, WM (2001) 1298.
33 Local Court Buchen VuR (1998) 42. The risk of
observing the PIN is not mentioned in the
following: District Court Hannover, WM (1998)
1223; Local Court Dinslaken, WM (1998) 1126;
Local Court Osnabrück, WM (1998) 1227; Local
Court Charlottenburg, WM (1998) 1224.
34 Local Court Wildeshausen, WM (1998) 1128; District
Court Bonn, WM (1995) 575; Local Court Frankfurt,
CR (1998) 723.
35 District Court Berlin, ZBB (1999) 85.
36 In German, Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei
Ausspähen der PIN, ZBB (1999) 88 (93) proposes:
‘Zunächst sind die Banken wie auch die
Teilnehmer am POS-Verfahren im Handel gehalten,
die Bedingungen bei der Eingabe so zu gestalten,
dass ein Ausspähen nicht möglich ist. Besonders
der Sichtschutz der Eingabetastaturen im Handel
erscheint im Falle unübersichtlichen Gedränges
allzu dürftig. Es wäre dringend zu überlegen, ob im
Handel die Legitimation des Kunden nicht
ausschließlich durch Unterschrift geschehen sollte,
wie bisher schon im sogenannten POZ-Verfahren.’
37 Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen
der PIN, ZBB (1999) 88 (93).
38 POZ system means point of sale without guarantee
of payment by using EC card plus a manuscript
signature (without a PIN); Dr. Tilman Hoppe,
Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen der PIN, ZBB
(1999) 93, referring to Ulrich Häde, Die Zahlung mit
Kredit- und Scheckkarten, ZBB (1994) 33, 41.
39 Gerwin Haybäck, Risikohaftung bei
missbräuchlichen Bankomatbehebungen: Ein
österreichisch-deutscher Rechtsvergleich, (2008)
II.D.3, p 96 and following; to EC liability Gerwin
Haybäck, ÖBA (1997) 256 and following.
40 Stating that the former POZ system was ‘highly
susceptibel (in German: “anfällig”) to misuse’:
Wolfgang Gößmann, § 68: ec-Kassen und POS-
System (Point-of-Sale). GeldKarte, in: Herbert
Schimansky, Hermann J. Bunte, and Hans-Jürgen
Lwowski, Bankrechts-Handbuch, Bd 1, 3rd edition
(2007) marginal number 12, 13.
41 Local Court Dortmund, BKR (2003) 912.
The information, but not the PIN, can be obtained from
the magnetic stripe on the reverse of the card. From
1982 on in Germany, detectors for an anti-fraud feature
known as the Moduliertes Merkmal (MM code) began to
be installed in ATMs, in order to provide protection from
cloned cards.31 The MM code consists of two
components, one stored on the magnetic stripe, and
one hidden within the material of the card. The MM
code is verified by the ATM with a cryptographic
operation that is performed to check that the
component of the MM code on the magnetic stripe
corresponds to the one hidden on the card. The correct
hidden component of the MM code cannot be calculated
from the information recorded on the magnetic stripe
alone. It is also necessary to have a cryptographic key,
which is stored in the MM code detection unit. ATMs in
Germany include a special MM detection unit and
sensor to read and verify the MM code, although cash
machine manufacturers are not permitted to obtain
access to or service the unit.
The prevailing case law indicates that it is considered
as grossly negligent behaviour where the customer fails
to realize the loss of the card by taking money out, then
putting the money, account statements, and card into a
coat pocket. The same consequences apply where the
customer does not protect the number pad.32 Generally,
the card holder has to take reasonable care. The mere
fact that the offender knew about the PIN is not
sufficient to prove the card holder’s breach of his duty to
care.33 In other reported cases, the chance of observing
a different secret number is mentioned, but was
excluded in the case under consideration.34 On one
occasion, the District Court in Berlin formally criticized
the lack of safety screening devices. In this case, the
criminals had detected the secret number and
thereupon pursued the card holder through Berlin. In
the view of the court, the card holder is not at fault if
she does not pay attention to people around during the
time it takes to make the withdrawal.35
To this end, Dr. Tilman Hoppe proposes the following:
‘First of all, the banks as well as the participants of the
POS system are requested to redesign the conditions in
such a way that is not possible to spy out the PIN.
Especially, the screen of the key pad at POS terminals in
trade seems inadequate in case of large crowds. It
should be taken into consideration whether the
identification of the customer is carried out as it is the
case with the POZ system.’36 Hoppe draws the
conclusion that the bank is obliged to prove that the
respective ATM is not protected at best. Measures of
improving the shield of the number pad are required,
especially in superstores.37
It is debatable whether Hoppe’s proposal is
acceptable: ‘to deliberate about whether in trade the
identification of the customer should take place as it is
the case with the POZ system.’38 This comment is in
conflict with a long experience in providing for the
security for withdrawals at ATMs in comparison with
those of the eurocheque system. With good cause, the
eurocheque as well as the (former) POZ system were
suspended (in 2001, respectively in 2007), because it
was easy to forge the manuscript signature but
impossible to detect whether the correct secret number,
if used, was used by the card holder, and not an
unauthorized third party. The PIN system is arguably
much more secure than payment instruments using the
signature to authorize the customer, because of the
cryptographic controls in place.39 Since 2006, the credit
services sector has refused to accept the risks of forgery
in connection with the POZ system based on the
manuscript signature of the customer.40
In 2003, the Local Court in Dortmund reached the
conclusion that there is no empirical deduction
providing that the card holder must have caused
unauthorized withdrawals from an ATM in a grossly
negligent way, where they retained the card with the
PIN, or noted the PIN on the card where it was stolen
from a rucksack.41 In contrast to the view of the Higher
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Regional Court of Frankfurt,42 most of the cases show
that obtaining the secret number is not to be considered
as absurd and only a theoretical possibility.
According to a recent decision of the Austrian
Supreme Court (OGH), the card holder is not liable for
withdrawals caused by unauthorized third parties where
he keeps the card and PIN safe. In this case, the card
holder took out 90 Euro from an ATM. When doing so,
he not aware that he was being observed by an
unknown person. The card holder protected the key pad
against observation from behind with the upper part of
his body. After the withdrawal, the customer put the
money and the card into a wallet, and the wallet into the
main pocket of his rucksack, which he then placed on
his back. He was followed by the thief, who stole the
card in the underground. When the card holder noticed
the theft, he initiated the block of the card. However,
310 Euro (the original 90 Euro plus a further withdrawal
of 310 Euro meant the maximum of 400 Euro maximum
was reached because that was the maximum for any
withdrawal a day) were withdrawn by an unauthorized
third person. The Austrian Supreme Court (OGH)
decided that the card holder did not breach his duty of
care. It was determined that he was not obliged to take
additional measures against criminals, such as
protecting the key pad with the second hand or
shielding it from lateral observation. In contrast to the
court of appeal, who considered it as negligent
behaviour because of the fact that the card holder had
worn the rucksack on his back and had therefore lost
the sight of the zip, the Austrian Supreme Court stated
in this case that the safekeeping of the card enclosed in
the main pocket of the card holder’s rucksack was
performed according to his duty to care. As a
consequence, the bank lost the appeal.
As a result, the court drew the conclusion that it is
sufficient to put a purse into a closed rucksack that is
worn on the back, and to protect the number pad with
the upper part of the body, even if the purse and card
disappear from the customer’s sight.43
Guessing or calculating the PIN
At the time of implementation of the ATM PIN system, it
was only considered an academic question whether
unauthorized third parties were able to find out the PIN,
because of the marginal probability of 0,03 per cent.44 It
is generally accepted that the Data Encryption Standard
(DES), which was applied until the end of 1997, was
considered cryptographically secure.45 Randomizing the
code using conventional means was considered
impossible. In 1992, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin
considered the PIN code secure, in reference to
statements of the Federal Office for Security and
Information Technology. Regarding the guessing or
randomizing the PIN code at that time, the Federal
Office acted on the assumption of 72 quadrillion
alternatives.46
However, this judgment was overturned by the rapid
development of the semiconductor technology. In 1994,
experienced criminals would have required 1900 years
to find out a PIN. Three years later, they would only have
needed 96 days, shortly after only 19 days, since 1999
no more than 24 hours.47 Thereafter, a decision of the
Higher Regional Court of Hamm initiated a serious
discussion as well as major doubts about the
cryptographic safety of DES used until the end of 1997.
In this now famous case, the court refused to grant a
prima facie evidence in favour of the bank. It was
possible that the criminal could have decoded the PIN
by using the data recorded on the ATM card. As a
consequence, the customer won the case.48
As a result, the cryptographic system was updated
and replaced by the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA). New, regionally generated PINs have been
distributed, and an on-line network has been
established.49 Thus, the credit services sector improved
the safety of the system against external attacks.
Nevertheless, several judgments in favour of the card
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following.
44 The Higher Regional Court of Berlin (German:
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statement from the Federal Office for Security and
Information Technology (Bundesamt für Sicherheit
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aus Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 292 and
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consists of 64 binary digits (0s or 1s) of which 56
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46 Federal Office for Security and Information
Technology (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik). For the judgment mentioned
above, see Higher Regional Court of Berlin, WM
(1992) 729.
47 The detailed report of 19 January 1999 is available
at: http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalte/te/
1771/1.html.
48 Higher Regional Court of Hamm, NJW (1997) 1711
and following. To the safety of the former PIN
system, sceptically Professor Dr. Werner Schindler,
Ec-Karten: Wie sicher ist die PIN-Nummer?, NJW-
CoR (1997) 284; Hans-Jürgen Stenger, Zur Kritik an
der Annahme einer Errechenbarkeit einer PIN, CoR
(1997) 363 and following.
49 Hartmut Strube, Haftungsrisiken der ec-Karte, WM
1210 (1998). In respect of the question of the safety
of the PIN, see Johannes Köndgen, Die
Entwicklung des privaten Bankrechts in den Jahren
1999-2003, NJW (2004) 1288.
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Frankfurt, WM (1999) 1922; Higher Regional Court
of Stuttgart, NJW-RR (2002) 1274.
51 Local Court Duisburg, JurPC Web-Dok (1999) 197,
Abs 1 – 15; cracking the RSA-155-Code, see
http://igw.tuwien.ac.at/fit/2001/fit05/sicherheit/der
_rsa_algorithmus.html.
52 District Court Stuttgart, WM (1999) 1934; Local
Court Dinslaken, WM (1998) 1126, referring to:
Local Court Hannover, WM (1997) 1207; Local Court
Wuppertal, WM (1997) 1209, against Higher
Regional Court of Hamm, NJW (1997) 1711. Likewise
the side proceeding of this case, see District Court
Darmstadt VuR (2000) 357; Rolf Aepfelbach and
Gerd Cimiotti, Zur Sicherheit des ec-Kartensystems,
WM (1998) 1218 and following.
53 The Federal Office for Security and Information
Technology considered the possibility of switching
off the ‘faulty operation counting function’ in the
card by technical manipulation as an ‘annoying
issue’, for which see Werner Schindler, Die neuen
PIN-Nummern der ec-Karten, NJW-CoR (1998) 223,
224.
54 Stefan Werner, Anscheinsbeweis und Sicherheit
des ec-PIN-Systems im Lichte der neuen
Rechtsprechung, WM (1997) 1516.
55 Local Court Frankfurt, NJW (1998) 687; Local Court
Osnabrück, WM (1998) 1127.
56 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2004)
3623; expressively confirmed two years later,
Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2007)
593.
57 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (1996)
1828; (1997) 528. Taking of evidence in the view of
the experts, cp. Manfred Lochter and Werner
Schindler, Missbrauch von PIN-gestützten
Transaktionen mit ec- und Kreditkarten aus
Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 297.
58 District Court Köln, WM (1995) 976; Local Court
Diepholz, WM (1995) 1919; Local Court
Schöneberg, WM (1997) 55; Local Court Hannover,
WM (1997) 64; Local Court Frankfurt, WM (1995)
880; Local Court Wuppertal, WM (1997) 1209; Local
Court Hannover, WM (1997) 1207; Local Court
Charlottenburg, WM (1997) 2082; Stefan Werner,
Beweislastverteilung und Haftungsrisiken im
elektronischen Zahlungsverkehr, MMR (1998) 232
and following; Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der
ec-Karten-Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269.
59 Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen
der PIN, ZBB (1999) 89; BGH NJW (1979) 1964;
BGH WM (1979) 417.
holder were delivered.50 For example, the Local Court at
Duisburg reached the conclusion that PIN codes could
be decoded by ordinary card readers. Even the RSA-155-
Code (512-bit numbers in the code have about 155
decimals) used in internet transactions (SSL protocol)
was cracked. Although it is admitted that some
withdrawals at ATMs are performed by using stolen
payment cards, this does not necessarily imply grossly
negligent behaviour on the part of the customer.51
On the other hand, there are still decisions in favour
of the prima facie evidence of ATM withdrawals that
either the card holder has withdrawn the money, or he
has not kept the secret number safe.52 The Higher
Regional Court of Hamm mentioned several methods of
manipulation, such as card reader, frequency of certain
number combinations, switching off the ‘faulty
operation counting function’ in the card by technical
manipulation,53 and others. However, in Germany, off-
line systems have not been in use since 1997.54 From
that time on, the prima facie evidence could not be
countered by the possibility that criminals discovered
the PIN.55 The Federal Court of Justice of Germany felt
confident that the security architecture of the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) system practiced
since 1997 is safe. For this reason, the court has
imposed significant demands on the customer
whenever the latter has attempted to counter the prima
facie evidence in favour of the bank.56
Prima facie evidence in favour of the bank – a
controversial issue
In contrast to other payment instruments, such as the
cheque, specific problems of evidence arise from the
ATM PIN system, because of the anonymous
communication process. If it is impossible to find out
who executed the withdrawal at issue, it is necessary to
begin the investigation with what is meant by a legally
performed electronic payment process. If the bank was
legally obliged to furnish full proof, it would result in
insoluble difficulties.
The prevailing judicial opinion is that the prima facie
evidence is granted in favour of the bank. This is proper
evidence which is equated to formal evidence. The
prima facie evidence comes into action in case of formal
and typical events. According to experience, the
circumstances of the case must either indicate only one
cause or one definite process.57 Exercising prima facie
evidence is based on the assertion that the decoding of
the PIN is impossible at short notice. The prima facie
evidence rests upon the mutable experience of life, as
well as technological progress.
Therefore, the use of the EC (ATM) card in connection
with the PIN establishes the ground for prima facie
evidence that either the card holder himself withdrew
the respective amount at the ATM, or enabled the
unauthorized withdrawal by grossly negligent
behaviour.58 Regarding unauthorized transactions
caused by third parties, the customer is required to
report abnormal events described in a plausible,
precise, and substantial manner, should he intend to
counter the prima facie evidence. In accordance with the
provisions of section 670 of the German Civil Code, only
where the customer succeeds in reporting such
evidence in substance, will a claim for disbursement not
be granted to the bank:59
§ 670 Ersatz von Aufwendungen
Macht der Beauftragte zum Zwecke der Ausführung
des Auftrags Aufwendungen, die er den Umständen
nach für erforderlich halten darf, so ist der
Auftraggeber zum Ersatz verpflichtet.
Section 670
Reimbursement of expenses
If the mandatory, for the purpose of performing the
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mandate, incurs expenses that he may consider to be
necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is
obliged to make reimbursement.
This may be the case if the card holder has
demonstrably not been at the place of the events (that
is, at the physical location of the unauthorized
withdrawal at the ATM or POS terminal) at the time in
question; if the ATM card was lost before the
withdrawal; if a video recording suggests another
conclusion, or if fingerprints on the retracted card are
not those of the customer, or a manipulated faulty
operation counter are detectable.60
Further, the ATM journal is of importance. The case
law indicates that the correct documentation of a single
payment by the ATM journal tape is considered as prima
facie evidence that the ATM has paid out money in the
amount of the documented sum.61 In case an ATM does
not dispense money at all or dispenses out too little,
this may be a fault that is documented by the ATM
journal. Time, place, sum, denomination, and data input
are documented exactly, although it is possible but
rather difficult to destroy the data of the ATM journal.
The authenticity of a card is checked by the modulated
feature (MM-Modul) in the ATM corresponding with the
chip on the card. The module on the card is read by the
bank, and data is exchanged between the card and the
bank, and if this data is accepted by the bank, it
provides sufficient evidence to the satisfaction of the
bank to infer that the customer’s card is physically in
the ATM. This evidence is considered to be prima facie
evidence that the customer’s card was inserted in the
ATM, and acts to demonstrate that a third person cannot
have inserted a duplicate EC card in the terminal.
Given such evidence, it is for the customer to verify
why atypical events are to be taken into consideration.62
The jurisprudence concerning the prima facie evidence
makes clear that, regarding electronic means of
payment, there is a close connection of prima facie
evidence and system security.63 If prima facie evidence is
to be accepted lawfully, it is necessary to assume the
security of the system is functioning correctly.
The customer cannot merely carry out his duty to
report the theft of a card and any subsequent misuse as
a matter of fact. He is also required to make clear what
the abnormal events are, and to described them.64 As
mentioned above, the Higher Regional Court of Hamm
did not grant a prima facie evidence to the bank in
1997.65 The court did not exclude the possibility that an
unauthorized third person could have been able to find
out the PIN by guessing or calculating it. This judgment
is now in the minority, because it acts on the
assumption that only the card holder knew the correct
PIN, and the use of the correct PIN was not sufficient to
prove the card holder’s breach of his duty of care.66
Position of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) and
subsequent case law 
Thereafter, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany
decided a case in favour of the bank, in which a third
person having stolen the payment card took 1000 Euro
out of the ATM.67 Considering the application of the 128
bit Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) in 1997, the
prima facie evidence suggested the fact that the thief
noticed the PIN only because the card holder was
negligent by keeping the secret number together with
the ATM card. It was concluded that the claimant must
have violated her duty of care by having recorded the
PIN on the card or stored the latter together with the
PIN. The Federal Court of Justice of Germany refused the
alternative explanation of decoding the PIN, because
this would be mathematically impossible. Although at
the time of this case, there was no evidence put forward
to indicate the code had been cracked. In the view of
the court, purely theoretical possibilities to find out the
PIN are not sufficiently suitable to disable the prima
facie evidence. The result means there is no reason to
obtain evidence regarding the system security.
Obtaining the PIN by observation is only considered as
a ‘different’ cause where the card is stolen in close
connection with the respective ATM, at the same time
the PIN was entered. In this instance, the card holder
was not able to substantiate such circumstances.
In the view of Stefan Werner, the Federal Court of
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(2001) 852.
67 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2004)
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Justice stated that, at least if a card and PIN are used
promptly at an ATM, the prima facie evidence argues for
the fact that the card holder has noted the PIN on the
card or stored it with the card. Certainly, this argument
only applies if different causes regarding the misuse can
be excluded, according to the experience of life.68 This
judgement was criticized by Christian Hofmann
inasmuch as it has ‘discharged the bank from
responsibility although the bank is able to battle
against failure of the payment system.’69 Rightly, the
Institute of Financial Services (Hamburg) emphasized
the significant problems for the customer to counter the
prima facie evidence under the prevailing
circumstances.70
The correlation between the theft of the card and the
unauthorized withdrawals as mentioned by the Federal
Court of Justice is somewhat ambiguous. The prima
facie evidence is granted to the bank at the expense of
the card holder where the PIN is entered and at the first
attempt at withdrawal succeeds within one hour after
the theft of the card. This time is short, hence the
explanation that the thief was able to decode the PIN by
using technical instruments is excluded.71
The Federal Court of Justice of Germany confirmed the
prevailing case law in a class action72 initiated by a
consumer advice centre.73 In this case, a number of
consumer claims of card holders were transferred to the
Consumer Advice Centre of Nordrhein-Westfalen. By
transferring the minor claims of 19 participants, a total
of 13,500 Euro was claimed, due to cards being used by
unauthorized third parties. The Federal Court of Justice
decided that the Advice Centre of Nordrhein-Westfalen
was a rightful claimant. In the interests of the consumer
as well as for the public benefit, the judicial assignment
for collection was considered to be necessary because it
produces a more effective enforcement than any
individual action. This is the case if there are
circumstances preventing a person with the right to
initiate an action, for example in the case of
disproportionately high costs of the proceedings, or a
high risk of litigation, or of practical problems of law
enforcement.74
In this decision, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed
the previous case law concerning the distribution of the
burden of proof in case of misuse of stolen EC cards.
The alternative of observing the PIN by a third party as a
‘different’ cause that only comes into question if the EC
card was stolen and where it can be shown that it
coincided with entering the PIN by the card holder at an
ATM or POS terminal. The court convincingly
emphasized the limits of the prima facie evidence. It is
not possible for a customer to challenge a bank
effectively until the safety standard of the electronic
payment system is no longer granted to be authentic or
genuine.
Conclusion
The distribution of risks between the EC card holder and
the bank in case of unauthorized withdrawals at ATMs
or POS terminals caused by third parties is closely
connected with the safety standard of the electronic
payment system. Despite the prevailing assertions of
the safety of the system, courts always have to question
if the current system grants a sufficient safety standard
in order to apply the prima facie evidence in favour of
the bank.
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Further improvements to the security architecture of
ATMs and POS terminals should be achieved. This
refers, for example, to an effective shielding of the
number pads, video control, increased program code
and internet safety. The traditional magnet strips have
to be replaced by highly effective computer chips. It is
time for a world-wide improvement and the introduction
of a secondary form of authentication, such as a
biometric measurement of the fingerprint or other
biometric measurements, such as user authorization
with an iris scan.75 For this purpose, several appropriate
projects, such as ‘FairPay’, are provided by the German
Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence.76 To this end,
banks, software developers as well as university
departments dealing with the internet and safety
technology, should work together.77
The costs may be high – but safety, particularly in the
electronic age, is worth its price, especially if it
ameliorates the anguish and suffering that people have
to go through when money is taken from their bank
account with authority.
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